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7.1  Introduction 
Do tax policies that stimulate a nation’s private saving rate increase its do- 
mestic capital stock or do the extra savings flow abroad? Does an increase in 
the corporate tax rate cause an outflow of capital that shifts the burden of that 
tax increase to labor and land? 
These  were  the  two  key  questions that  motivated the  1980  Feldstein- 
Horioka (FH) study of the relation between domestic saving rates and domes- 
tic investment. FH reasoned that, if  domestic saving were added to a world 
saving pool and domestic investment competed for funds in that same world 
saving pool, there would be no correlation between a nation’s saving rate and 
its rate of  investment. The statistical evidence showed that, on the contrary, 
the long-term saving and  investment rates of  the individual industrialized 
countries in the OECD are highly correlated. The data were consistent with 
the view that a sustained one-percentage-point increase in the saving rate in- 
duced nearly a one-percentage-point  increase in the investment rate. 
Much has happened in the international capital markets during the decade 
since the Feldstein-Horioka  study was done. The 1980s saw an unprecedented 
increase in the international flow of capital to the United States. Capital mar- 
ket barriers in Japan and Europe have been lowered or eliminated. This expe- 
rience raises the question of whether the empirical regularity observed for the 
1960s and 1970s continued through the  1980s. Even those studies that fol- 
lowed Feldstein-Horioka were  limited  to  data for the  1970s or the  early 
1980s.’ One purpose of the present study is to examine the experience for the 
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period  1980 through  1986 and to compare the results with the analysis for 
earlier years. 
7.1.1 
The initial FH paper created confusion about the interpretation of the results 
by  discussing them as evidence about international capital mobility. Econo- 
mists who believe that the evidence on interest arbitrage implies that there is 
perfect capital mobility were therefore inclined to reject the FH findings. For- 
tunately, Jeffrey Frankel (1986) clarified the issue by reminding everyone that 
perfect capital mobility does not imply the international equalization of  real 
interest rates.  * 
More specifically, as Frankel pointed out, the interest arbitrage condition of 
integrated capital markets refers to nominal interest rates only. Perfect capital 
mobility implies equal ex ante real  interest rates only for time periods for 
which the expected change in  the exchange rate equals the difference in the 
expected inflation rates. As Frankel stresses, since ex ante purchasing power 
parity may not hold even for periods as long as a decade, the existence of 
perfect capital markets (in the sense that the interest differential between two 
countries is equal to the expected change in the nominal exchange rate) does 
not imply a continuing equality of expected real interest rates. An increase in 
saving in one country that gives rise to an equal increase in its investment 
need not violate the nominal interest arbitrage condition even though it causes 
a decline in the real interest rate. 
Purchasing power parity does not appear to hold, even in the long run that 
is relevant for the tax policy questions that motivated this research. But even 
if it did, in that very long run the difference between the nominal interest rates 
in each pair of countries may no longer equal the expected change in the ex- 
change rate because of investor risk aversion. An investor looking ahead for 
10 years or more must be concerned about risks of  changes in tax rules on 
foreign source income or even in political institutions that can affect the value 
of  his international investments. Opportunities to hedge the interest rate or 
exchange rate risk on long-term positions are far more limited than for short- 
term positions, or at least have been until quite recently. For such long hori- 
zons, investor risk aversion may induce portfolio investors to prefer invest- 
ments in their own currency. As a result, expected real interest rates may also 
differ internationally in the long run. 
In  a riskless  world,  long-term nominal  interest rate  arbitrage could  be 
achieved even though international investors only took net  positions in the 
short-term market if  domestic investors arbitraged short-term and long-term 
domestic interest rates. Once risk is introduced, however, arbitrage by hedged 
international short-term investors and the equilibrium of risk-averse domestic 
investors who hold both long-term and short-term securities is not enough to 
provide international equality of long-term rates. 
As  an example, a mean-variance investor will allocate his wealth among 
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assets in proportions that vary positively with yield and inversely with risk. 
An investor who has a high degree of risk aversion or who attributes a large 
subjective variance to long-term investments in foreign assets may want to 
invest a large share of his portfolio in  domestic assets (depending on asset 
yield covariances) even when a substantial expected yield difference exists in 
favor of the foreign assets. Since the mean-variance investor’s optimal propor- 
tional allocation of the assets is independent of the total value, an increase in 
saving that raises the total pool of  funds will be  invested primarily  in the 
domestic economy. 
In short, there is no presumption that real long-term yields would be equal- 
ized even if all investors were completely free to invest wherever in the world 
they  want.  Moreover, broad  classes of  financial institutions (and, in  some 
countries, nonfinancial corporations as well) are in fact not permitted by reg- 
ulatory authorities to take net positions in foreign curriences. Many nonfinan- 
cia1 corporations also choose to avoid net  foreign exchange exposure as  a 
matter of  policy  rather than to evaluate the opportunities available at each 
point in time. The absence of these substantial pools of funds from the poten- 
tial pool of arbitrage funds would not be important if other investors were risk 
neutral. However, if the remaining investors are risk averse, the limited size 
of  the mobile pool of unhedged funds increases the potential importance of 
risk aversion and, therefore, the scope for expected real rates of return to re- 
main unequal. 
7.1.2  Government Policies and the Current Account 
Although the lack of ex ante purchasing power parity and the risk aversion 
of  international investors are sufficient to permit domestic saving rates to in- 
fluence substantially the rate of  domestic investment, the observed link be- 
tween saving and investment may also reflect explicit government policy de- 
cisions. 
It is easy to understand why governments would want to restrict the size of 
trade imbalances in general and of changes in trade imbalances in particular. 
Since an increase in the merchandise trade deficit means a loss of exports and 
the substitution of imports for domestic production, the affected domestic in- 
dustries are likely to seek government actions to shrink the trade deficit. A 
decrease in the merchandise trade deficit caused by a spontaneous increase in 
the demand for the country’s exports may be welcome if there is excess capac- 
ity in the economy but would be resisted by  the government as a source of 
inflation if there is not excess capacity. Since a rise in exports in a fully em- 
ployed economy also means a fall in the production of other goods and ser- 
vices, the industries producing for the domestic market are likely to seek pol- 
icies to reverse the rise in exports. 
These arguments refer to changes in the trade balance rather than to its 
level. Why should a government resist a long-run current account deficit or 
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want to shift to a long-run imbalance because of its reluctance to accept the 
dislocations involved in changing the pattern of production from trade balance 
to trade imbalance. But there are also reasons why a government would resist 
a long-term trade and current account imbalance in addition to the problems 
of transition. 
Because of capital income taxes, a persistent capital outflow diverts domes- 
tic savings to investment abroad that has a lower return to the originating 
nation. Each government therefore has an incentive to seek a capital inflow 
and to resist the outflow of its own capital. 
A country with a trade surplus and a capital outflow also has the opportu- 
nity to trade a reduction in the trade surplus for a higher level of real income 
(through an improvement in the terms of trade) and a temporarily lower level 
of  inflation (through the favorable “supply shock” of an increase in the level 
of the currency). 
There are a variety of policies that governments can use to shift the econ- 
omy toward trade and  current account balance. In the short run, monetary 
policy can be used to influence the exchange rate and the level of  economic 
activity. Summers (1988) has suggested that governments may tailor the size 
of  the budget deficit to offset differences between private saving and invest- 
ment. Other possibilities include the use of  targeted tax policies designed to 
increase or decrease the level of investment or private saving: the investment 
tax credit, the schedule of depreciation allowances, the availability of special 
tax preferred savings accounts, a difference in  the tax rates on capital and 
labor income. and so on. 
7.1.3  Implication for the Effects of Fiscal Policies 
The reason that saving and investment are closely correlated is important 
for answering the questions that motivated the original study. 
Consider the Summers (1988) hypothesis that the close correlation between 
investment and saving reflects the response of government deficit policy to 
shifts in private investment and saving. If a tax change that encourages private 
saving is offset by  an increase in the government budget deficit, there is no 
rise in capital formation. If  however the close correlation between saving and 
investment reflects either the reluctance of  private risk-averse investors to 
move capital abroad (so that private investment rises automatically) or a gov- 
ernment tax policy to stimulate private investment until it absorbs all of the 
increase in domestic saving (rather than permit a capital outflow or a contrac- 
tion of  national income), the tax-induced rise in  saving does get converted 
into greater domestic capital formation. 
The reason for the observed saving-investment correlation is also important 
for assessing whether a tax on investment income causes a capital outflow that 
permits the incidence of the tax to be shifted to labor. If the observed saving- 
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investors to shift capital abroad, the increase in the capital tax causes a fall in 
the net of tax rate of return and thus no shifting of the tax burden. In contrast, 
if the saving-investment  equality occurs because of a government decision to 
increase the  budget deficit to absorb the capital that  would  otherwise go 
abroad, leaving just enough domestic saving to finance a level of  investment 
at which the after-tax return is equal to the after-tax return abroad, the tax is 
fully shifted. 
In support of the “endogenous deficit policy” hypothesis, Summers (1988) 
presents a regression for a cross-section of industrialized countries of the av- 
erage deficit-GNP ratio for the period of  1973-80  on the average private 
saving-investment  gap (the difference between net private saving and net pri- 
vate investment) for those same years. He finds a coefficient of 0.72 and con- 
cludes that it implies that 72 percent of the net savings gap may be offset by 
an explicit budget deficit policy. 
There is however a quite different interpretation of the Summers deficit re- 
gression. If the long-run level of the budget deficit is thought of as exogenous 
(reflecting political considerations in the county rather than an attempt to off- 
set the saving-investment gap), then the regression may only reflect the impact 
of the budget deficit on the level of investment. This would be the traditional 
crowding out of private investment by government deficits. Summers presents 
no evidence or reason to think that his regression should be interpreted as a 
policy response function rather than as a description of  the crowding out of 
private investment by government deficits. We  return to this in  section 7.5 
below. 
7.1.4  Statistical Estimates 
First, however we will turn to the evidence on the link between saving and 
investment in the most recently available data. We  also take this opportunity 
to consider whether the correlation between saving and investment is equally 
strong for different subsets of countries within the OECD, including separate 
analyses for the European Economic Community (EEC) and non-EEC coun- 
tries. 
Previous comments on the FH regressions raised the issue of  the possible 
endogeneity of national saving rates. This was actually discussed in the origi- 
nal FH paper and estimates using instrumental variables provided as a check 
on the possible bias from this source. The instrumental variables were demo- 
graphic and social security variables. The resulting coefficient confirmed the 
ordinary least squares results. Since this issue has been explored rather thor- 
oughly in  the earlier paper, we will not present such instrumental variable 
estimates in the current analysis. 
We  will however examine two other issues in some detail. The first is the 
suggestion by  Obstfeld (1986) that the observed correlation may reflect the 
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replicate the Obstfeld analysis in section 7.3 and show that, although it can in 
theory explain the observed saving-investment correlation, the actual data are 
not consistent with the Obstfeld hypothesis. 
The second is an analysis of the dynamic adjustment process by which sav- 
ing and investment adjust to changes in the saving-investment gap. We  show 
in section 7.6 that the process can be described as an adjustment of  investment 
to close the gap and not an adjustment of  saving. We  also present some evi- 
dence that suggests that the desired gap is not zero in all countries but that 
countries adjust investment to close the difference between the actual saving- 
investment gap and a preferred gap. 
7.2  Is Capital Market Integration Increasing? 
The reduction in government barriers to international capital flows, the cre- 
ation of  extensive new hedging markets, and the growing sophistication of 
financial institutions around the world have increased the likelihood of  net 
capital flows. The sharp fall in the U.S. national saving rate in the 1980s (due 
to both  the increased budget deficit and the decline in private saving) also 
provided a major incentive for the shift of capital to the United States. 
The evidence in this section indicates that there has in fact been a substan- 
tial decline in the correlation between the rates of gross domestic saving and 
gross domestic investment. However, the effect of additional domestic saving 
on domestic investment remains quite substantial. Even in the  1980s, each 
dollar of  additional saving is associated with an increase in  investment of 
more than 50 cents. 
The analysis is based on the regression equation 
I,/Y, = a,  + a, S,/Y,, 
where I, is gross investment (as defined by the OECD and including inventory 
investment), Y, is gross domestic product, and S, is gross saving. The esti- 
mates use data for 23 OECD countries (excluding Luxembourg). The unit of 
observation is a single country and the data for that country has been averaged 
over a group of years. The coefficient a, that indicates the proportion of the 
incremental savings that  is invested domestically will be referred to as the 
“savings retention coefficient .” 
Consider first the estimates for gross investment presented in column 1 of 
table 7.1. In the decade of  the 1960s, each extra dollar of  domestic saving 
increased domestic investment 91.4 cents with a standard error of 6.3 cents. 
For the next decade this had declined to 80.5 cents with a standard error of 
12.1 cents. The decline of  10.9 cents is, however, less than the  13.6 cent 
standard error of the difference. The seven available years of  the 1980s shows 
a further decline to 60.7 cents with a standard error of  12.6 cents. Although 
the  19.8 cents decline from the 1970s is only slightly larger than the asso- 
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Table 7.1  The Changing Impact of Domestic Savings on Domestic Investment 
8 Non-EEC 
14 Non-EEC  17 OECD  OECD 
23 OECD  9 EEC  OECD  European  European 
Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries 
Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net 
Period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
1960-69  ,848 
(.063) 
1970-79  ,671 
(.121) 
1980-86  ,863 
(.126) 
1960-73  ,718 
(.066) 
1974-86  ,868 
(. 145) 
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,877  ,870 
(.166)  (.146) 
,810  ,636 
(.399)  (.239) 
,792  ,555 
(.203)  (.224) 
,837  .906 
(.232)  (.105) 
.874  ,521 
(.303)  ( ,308) 
.847  ,668 
(.218)  (.185) 
1960s implies a more significant relation. From the 1960s to the 1980s the 
decline of 30.7 cents is more than twice the standard error associated with this 
difference. 
Another way of comparing the earlier and later parts of the 27-year sample 
period is to contrast the earlier fixed exchange rate years (1960-73)  with the 
later floating rate years (1974-86).  During the earlier 14 years the savings 
retention coefficient was 0.91 1 (standard error 0.066), barely different from 
the result for the decade of the 1960s. The coefficient for the later 13 years 
was, however, 0.669, much more similar to the coefficient for the 1980s. The 
difference of 0.242 is approximately 1.5 times it standard error. 
The final row of  column 1 in table 7.1 shows that, for the 27-year period as 
a whole, the savings retention coefficient was 0.791 with a standard error of 
0.094. A potentially interesting line of  analysis that we  have not  pursued 
would be to test whether the investment-savings relation has changed at  a 
constant rate during this period or has had significant step changes after the 
beginning of the floating rate period or in the decade of the 1980s. 
The net  saving and  investment relations (shown in  col.  2 of  table 7.1) 
do not  indicate a fall over time similar to the corresponding gross saving- 
investment coefficients. The key savings retention coefficient only declines 
from 0.913 in the 1960s to 0.864 in the 1970s and 0.792 in 1980-86; none of 
the difference, including the difference between the 1960s and the 1980s, is as 
large as its standard error. 
This  difference between  the  gross  and  net  saving-investment relations 
masks a more complex difference between the changes over time in the coun- 208  Martin Feldstein and Philippe Bacchetta 
tries and among the non-EEC industrial countries of  the OECD. The differ- 
ences in experience among different groups of countries is the subject of the 
next section of this paper. 
7.3  Capital Flows and the EEC 
Although capital might in principle flow with equal ease among all coun- 
tries or at least all industrial countries, the availability of market information, 
the existence of  institutional relationships, and the perception of  risk might 
make capital flows greater among some pairs of countries than among others. 
More specifically, in the current context, each extra dollar of  saving in one 
country may be divided between the home capital market (which gets the larg- 
est share) and other individual national capital markets in a way that depends 
on a variety of institutional and other country-specific factors. 
We  have explored this possibility by  looking separately at the investment- 
saving equation for nine of  the EEC countries (excluding the new entrants, 
Spain and Portugal, as well as Luxembourg) and the investment-saving equa- 
tion for the remaining 14 OECD countries. It should be emphasized that the 
EEC savings retention coefficient does not reflect the extent of the capital flow 
among the EEC countries but rather the extent to which individual EEC coun- 
tries retain their national savings within the saving country. 
Consider first the behavior of  the investment-saving relation in  the nine 
EEC countries shown in  columns 3 and 4 of  table 7.1. The gross savings 
retention coefficients, shown in column 3, are lower among the EEC countries 
than for the entire OECD group and decline much more rapidly between the 
1970s and the  1980s. The decline from 0.742 in the 1960s to 0.652 in  the 
1970s was not large, but this was followed by a sharp decline to only 0.356 in 
the  1980-86  period.  By  comparison, the  coefficients of  the  14 non-EEC 
members of the OECD was 0.962 in the 1960s, 0.810 in the 1970s, and 0.578 
in the 1980s. 
We  should caution, however, that the standard errors of  the coefficients for 
the EEC countries are quite large since each is based on only nine observa- 
tions. Thus the sharp decline from 0.652 in the 1970s to 0.356 in the 1980s is 
only two-thirds as large as its standard error of 0.456. We  cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there was no change. Even the fall from 0.742 in the 1960s to 
0.356 in the 1980s is only slightly greater than its standard error of 0.359; the 
hypothesis of no change cannot be formally rejected with this small sample. 
The test, however, is of low power because of the small sample size, and we 
would emphasize the large decline rather than its statistical “insignificance.” 
When we shift from gross to net saving and investment, the pattern of the 
savings retention coefficients differs even more sharply between the EEC and 
non-EEC countries. As already noted, among the OECD as a whole, the net 
saving-investment relation shows virtually no change between the early and 209  National Saving and International Investment 
later periods (see col. 2). In contrast, column 4 shows that the net saving- 
investment coefficients declined sharply within the EEC between the 1970s 
and  1980s. This contrast is seen most clearly when the EEC coefficients of 
column 4 are compared with the non-EEC coefficients of column 6. 
Although the small sample of EEC countries makes it difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions, these data appear to indicate that there have been greater 
capital flows out of the individual EEC countries (i.e., a smaller share of in- 
cremental savings is retained with the saving country) than among the non- 
EEC countries and that the extent of  this capital mobility increased in the 
1980s. 
We  have also examined the saving-investment behavior in the wider group 
of all 17 European OECD countries (col. 7 and 8 of table 7.1) and in the non- 
EEC European OECD countries (col. 9 and 10). The results shows that the 
non-EEC European countries behaved more like the EEC countries than like 
the non-European members of the OECD. 
These results are not only interesting in themselves as an indication of the 
increasing integration of  the European capital markets but also suggest that 
the reason why the savings retention coefficients are generally much greater 
than zero reflects the extent of informational and institutional links among the 
capital markets. The coefficient is lower for the EEC countries despite formal 
barriers on capital exports in some countries because of the strength of insti- 
tutional links. Even when capital is completely mobile in principle, actual 
capital flows are retarded by ignorance and risk aversion. 
7.4  The “Missing” Growth Variable 
The surprising strength of  the savings retention coefficient in the original 
FH study led subsequent researchers to postulate that the strength of the coef- 
ficient may reflect the impact of some missing variables that influence invest- 
ment and are correlated with savings. Obstfeld (1986) has developed the idea 
that the missing variable may be the growth rate of GDP or a combination of 
the GDP growth rate and of labor’s share of national income. 
Life-cycle theory implies that these two variables determine the long-term 
behavior of a country’s saving rate. Obstfeld posits a model in which the rate 
of  output growth is also an important determinant of  the country’s rate of 
investment; although demand-determined variations in  output growth may 
have an important influence on the timing of investment, in the current context 
of comparing long-term differences in national investment rates we would be 
more inclined to regard output growth as the result of  previous capital invest- 
ment than to look upon output growth as an exogenous determination of in- 
vestment. Obstfeld (1986) used data on GDP growth and on the ratio of em- 
ployee compensation to national  income in  individual OECD countries to 
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that would result in a simple theoretical model. He then used these simulated 
investment and  saving ratios to estimate statistically the basic  investment- 
saving ratio. 
The Obstfeld model assumes complete world capital mobility; that is, the 
only link between saving and investment in each country is that they depend 
on common variables. Nevertheless, a regression of the simulated investment- 
GDP ratio on the simulated saving-GDP ratio produces coefficients that are 
approximately equal to one, with the precise coefficient depending on the 
group of countries selected. 
Although we regard this as an ingenious demonstration of how the observed 
investment-saving relation might in principle be just a spurious reflection of 
the missing growth and income distribution variables, we do not find it con- 
vincing. The real test of whether the savings variables is just a proxy for the 
growth and distribution variables is whether the inclusion of growth and dis- 
tribution causes a significant change in the savings retention coefficient in a 
regression using the actual saving and investment variables instead of the sim- 
ulated ones. 
To  test this in a way that makes it strictly comparable to Obstfeld’s analysis, 
we began by  following his procedure to create synthetic saving and invest- 
ment variables. We  used  observations for the same countries and years as 
Obstfeld. Despite the usual OECD data revisions, we found that we were able 
to reproduce his results quite closely. For example, with a sample of 17 coun- 
tries for the period 1970-79,  Obstfeld found a savings retention coefficient of 
0.86 (with a standard error of 0.81) and we found a coefficient of  1.01 with a 
standard error of 0.78. Adding the product of the growth and income distri- 
bution variables to the Obstfeld synthetic equation caused the savings absorp- 
tion coefficient to become -  0.75 with a standard error of 0.10 while the other 
variable “explained” the variation in the synthetic investment series. 
However, when we replaced the synthetic variables with the actual saving 
and investment variables, the estimated savings retention coefficient was little 
affected by adding the growth and distribution variables to the equation. More 
specifically, with the same Obstfeld sample of countries and years, but using 
the actual saving and investment data rather than the synthetic ones, the esti- 
mated coefficient of the savings variable was 0.88 (with a standard error of 
0.12) in the basic regression. When the growth and distribution variables were 
added to the equation, the coefficient of the saving variable because 0.87 (with 
standard error of 0.13). 
Similar results were obtained with other combinations of  growth rates and 
income. In no case did the inclusion of the growth and distribution variables 
substitute for the effect of the savings variable as a determinant of domestic 
saving. 
The implication of  this is clear. Although the estimated savings retention 
coefficient could in theory reflect only the indirect effect of omitted growth 
and distribution variables. the evidence indicates that this is not so. 211  National Saving and International Investment 
7.5  Budget Deficits 
As  we  wrote in section 7.1, Summers (1988) has noted that there is  an 
alternative possible explanation for the observed relation between investment 
and savings rates. Summers suggests that if  governments do not like capital 
outflows or inflows, they might adjust their budget deficits to offset the gap 
between investment and private saving. 
As evidence of this possibility, Summers presents a regression of the ratio 
of the budget deficit to GDP on the difference between the private savings ratio 
(i.e., the ratio of  domestic savings plus the budget deficit to GDP) and the 
investment-GDP ratio: 
(2)  DEFIY  = b,  + b, (PS -  OIY, 
where DEF is the general government budget deficit (i.e, the OECD measure 
of  general government saving with the sign changed), PS is private saving 
(Let saving as previously defined plus the budget  deficit) and I  and  Y  are 
investment and gross domestic product as previously defined. 
For a sample of  14 countries for the period 1973-80,  Summers obtained a 
coefficient of 0.72.3  Taken at face value, this would imply that each dollar of 
the private saving-investment gap induces governments to increase their bud- 
get deficit by  72 cents.  Since the precise sample used  by  Summers is not 
known, we reestimated his equation ([2] above) with data for 13 OECD coun- 
tries for which data are available for the period 1973 through 1980. The esti- 
mated coefficient of  0.68 with a standard error of 0.15 is quite close to the 
original estimate by Summers. 
There are, however, serious problems of interpretation of equation (2). Al- 
though such a model of deficit adjustment may have merit as a description of 
short-term stabilization policy, we find it very implausible as an explanation 
of why long-term differences in budget deficit ratios persist among countries. 
A more likely explanation of the correlation between budget deficits and net 
saving ratios is that budget deficit ratios are “exogenous” (reflecting political 
and historical characteristics) and that high  deficit ratios crowd out private 
investment in the traditional way.  Similarly, countries with budget surpluses 
may “crowd in” more private investment. 
To  assess the plausibility of  this alternative specification, we  reorder the 
variables of equation (2) and estimate the equation: 
(3)  IIY  = c, + c,  DEFIY  + c2 PSIY 
This is a natural generalization of the basic equation (1) that divides domestic 
saving  into  two  components:  private  saving  (PS)  and  government saving 
(- DEF). The original basic model implies that the coefficients c, and c, are 
equal in absolute value but opposite in sign with private saving having a posi- 
tive effect and the budget deficit a negative effect. 
The results, presented in table 7.2, are generally consistent with this gen- 212  Martin Feldstein and Philippe Bacchetta 
Table 7.2  Investment and the Components of Domestic Saving 
Number of  Private 
Period  Countries  Deficit  Saving 
1970-85  13  -  ,865  ,699 
(.150)  (.112) 
1965-84  9  -  ,948  ,747 
(.153)  (.124) 
eralizatiod of the original basic model. For example, with the largest possible 
sample (13 countries for 1970-85)  the coefficient of  net private savings is 
0.699 with a standard error of 0.112 while the coefficient of the budget deficit 
is  -0.865  with a standard error of 0.150. Taken at face value, these coeffi- 
cients imply that each dollar of  gross private saving adds 70 cents to gross 
investment while each dollar of  the budget deficit crowds out 0.87 cents of 
investment. 
The higher absolute coefficient on government deficits than on private sav- 
ing is what would be expected if  governments are likely to invest less when 
they face a budget deficit and to invest more when tax receipts are large rela- 
tive to current spending. To see this, note that total investment includes gov- 
ernment sector investment (I,) as well as private sector investment (ZJ,  while 
the government deficit is defined as the difference between government cur- 
rent outlays and taxes. Assume that private investment depends on the total 
pool of  national savings net of government borrowing for both current and 
investment outlays: 
(4)  ZJY  = (Y  + p (T - G  -1,  +PS)/Y + E, 
where T is total tax revenue of  the government. Note that this implies that 
government investment does not directly reduce (or increase) private invest- 
ment but does so only through the domestic availability of funds. 
Adding government investment to both sides of the equation and regroup- 
ing terms yields: 
(5)  Zp/Y + ZgIY  = 01  + p (7’  -  G)/Y + pPS/Y  + (1-p) ZgIY  +  E. 
A regression in the form of equation (3) is thus equivalent to estimating the 
“true” equation (5) with the last term omitted. The relation between the esti- 
mated coefficients c,  and c,  of equation (3) and the parameter p of equation 
(5) depends on the relation between government investment and the other two 
variables. If  government investment does not depend on the level of private 
saving but does respond positively to government current budget surpluses, 
the estimated coefficient of the government surplus variable (T -  G)/Y will 
equal the true coefficient (p) plus the product of  (1 - p) and the regression 
of  IJY and (T -  G)/Y.  This implies that the coefficient of  the government 
surplus variable (- c,  of  eq.  [3])  will exceed the coefficient of  the private 213  National Saving and International Investment 
saving variable (c,  of  eq. [3]). The bias is, however, relatively small. If  the 
“true” coefficient p is 0.75 and the long-run propensity of the government to 
spend current surpluses on government investment is as large as 0.4, the esti- 
mated value of  -c, will be 0.85 instead of 0.75. 
In practice, the difference between the estimates of -  c,  and c, is not statis- 
tically significant with a sample of only 13 observations. Estimating the con- 
strained equation for this sample produces a coefficient of 0.76 on domestic 
saving with a standard error of 0.09. Comparing the sums of squared residuals 
for the constrained and unconstrained specifications implies an F-statistic  of 
0.81 with 1 and 10 degrees of freedom. Since the critical value for 5 percent 
significance is 4.96, we cannot reject the simple original specification. 
Note that the estimate of c,  is an unbiased estimate of the true parameter p 
regardless of the size of  p and of  the government’s propensity to do public 
investment as a function of the government’s current surplus as long as the 
government investment is not influenced by the private saving rate. 
The problem of  distinguishing between the “deficit reaction function ap- 
proach” of equation (2) and the “components of domestic saving” approach of 
equation (3) cannot be definitively resolved by these estimates since the statis- 
tical problem is one of identification and, more fundamentally, of  providing 
the theoretically correct specification. It is helpful in this to look at the under- 
lying raw data in the context of what we know about the particular economies. 
Table 7.3 presents data on the deficit, net private saving, and net investment 
for the decade of the 1970s and the period 1980-84. Such data are only avail- 
able for 13 countries. 
It is noteworthy that in the 1970s the “deficits” were negative in all of the 
Table 7.3  Budget Deficits, Private Saving, and Investments 
1970-79  1980-84 
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countries except the United States and Belgium. The other countries had sur- 
pluses ranging from  1 percent of GDP to 7 percent of  GDP.  By  the 1980s, 
most of  these countries were experiencing actual deficits. It would be very 
interesting but beyond our capability to examine the historic reasons for these 
shifts country by country. 
Consider, however, the case of the United States, which went from a deficit 
of  1 percent of GNP in  the 1970s to 3 percent in the first half of the 1980s. 
For the 1970s, the U.S. deficit was the largest of all 13 countries; indeed, none 
of the others had a deficit. It is hard to argue, however, that this represented a 
fiscal policy decision aimed at supporting aggregate demand since inflation 
was a serious problem during most of  this decade and there was a general 
feeling that national saving was too low. While it might in theory be argued 
that the shift to a larger deficit in the 1980s was a way of dealing with the large 
recession in  1980-82,  the actual historic record shows that the recession was 
the unintended consequence of a political inability to obtain sufficient domes- 
tic spending cuts to pay  for the combination of  tax  cuts, defense spending 
increases, and higher interest payments on the national debt. 
One caveat should be  indicated about this analysis. Government deficits 
reflect payments of  interest on the national debt because such interest pay- 
ments are part of current government outlay. Since inflation differences among 
the countries influence the interest rates on the government debt, the deficits 
reflect to differing degrees the inflation erosion of  the government debt and 
are in this sense not “true” deficits. This is likely to be more important in the 
international context than over time in individual countries. 
To  examine the sensitivity of our conclusions to the failure to adjust for 
inflation, we  have repeated the analysis using inflation-adjusted government 
deficits and private savings using data constructed by Muller and Price (1984) 
(as given by Roubini and Sachs 1989). The inflation-adjusted results are very 
similar to the unadjusted estimates. Using data for the largest available sample 
(13 countries for the period  1971 through  1986), the disaggregated savings 
coefficients are almost exactly equal in absolute value: 
(6)  Z/Y  =  0.019 - 0.89 DEF*/Y + 0.88PS*/Y 
(0.012)  (0.14)  (0.10) 
where DEF* and PS* are both inflation adjusted. The evidence clearly sup- 
ports the view that either source of variation in national saving has the same 
effect on domestic investment. 
7.6  Dynamic Adjustment 
As Feldstein (1983) and Feldstein-Horioka (1980) emphasized, the close 
relationship between domestic saving and domestic investment is a long-term 
characteristic and does not hold from year to year. With time-series data, the 
savings retention coefficients are much lower than in cross-section analyses. 
It is possible however to examine the dynamic adjustment process by which 215  National Saving and International Investment 
the close association  between  domestic  investment  and domestic  saving is 
maintained. The evidence presented in this section supports the view that it is 
domestic  investment that responds to changes in domestic  saving. The evi- 
dence is not consistent with a view that domestic saving (either private alone 
or the combination of private and public) responds to shifts in investment. 
Consider therefore the simple adjustment process by which the change in 
the investment ratio from year to year (Z,/Y, -  Z, -  ,/Y,  -  ,) varies inversely with 
the previous year’s investment-savings gap (Z,  I -  S, JY, 
(7) 
If an increase in the gap between investment and saving causes investment to 
decline, d, is negative.  Such a decline could be caused by a rise in interest 
rates induced by the “shortage” of savings in year t - 1. The evidence pre- 
sented below shows that d, is in fact negative, supporting the view that invest- 
ment responds to shifts in saving. 
A similar regression shows that the saving rate does not respond to the gap 
between investment and savings. For this purpose, we estimate the equation 
(8)  S,/Y, -  Sr-,/Yr-l  = e, + e, U-,  -  S,-J/Y,-,. 
Although a shortage of savings could raise saving by increasing the interest 
rate or inducing an increase in the government surplus, the evidence suggest 
that this does not occur. Of course, this is quite consistent with much previous 
evidence that investment is more sensitive to interest rates than saving. 
The results are presented in table 7.4. Equation (1) presents the results cor- 
ZjY, -  1, -,/Y,-,  = do + d, (I,-, -  S,-  ,)/Y,-, 
Table 7.4  Dynamic Adjustment of  Investment and Saving in 23 OECD 
Countries 
~~~~  ~ 
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responding to equation (8) for the 23 OECD countries (i.e., all OECD coun- 
tries except Luxembourg) for the period 1961-86.  The coefficient of  -0.227 
(with a standard error of 0.026) implies that an investment-savings  gap of one 
percentage point of GDP causes the investment-GDP ratio to fall by approxi- 
mately a quarter of a percentage point in the following year. After three years 
the adjustment of investment alone would reduce the gap to less than one-half 
a percent of GDP; after six years, 80 percent of the gap would be eliminated. 
The corresponding saving equation is presented as equation 2 of table 7.4. 
The coefficient of  -0.036  is small both absolutely and relative to its standard 
error of 0.024 and of the wrong sign. The data thus imply no response of the 
saving rate to the saving-investment gap. 
Disaggregating  the  adjustment  coefficient  into  separate coefficients  for 
lagged investment and lagged saving supports this interpretation of  the evi- 
dence. In the unconstrained investment equation (eq.  [3] of  table 7.4), the 
coefficients of the lagged investment ratio is -  0.275 with a standard error of 
0.028 while the coefficient of the lagged saving variable is 0.198 with a stan- 
dard error of  0.027. The coefficients are close enough in  magnitude to be 
equal for practical purposes. But if the point estimates are taken literally, the 
evidence implies that a rise in the savings ratios induces a slightly smaller rise 
in subsequent investment than a fall in the investment ratio. This is just what 
might be expected if  the stochastic disturbance contains a serially correlated 
determinant of investment. 
Dividing the sample into the fixed-rate first half (1961-73)  and the floating- 
rate second half (1974-86)  shows that the results are similar in both subper- 
iods, with some indication of a slower response in the second half than in the 
earlier period. These results are shown in equations (5)-(8) of table 7.4. This 
confirms the results presented in section 7.2. 
The constant terms in equations (7) and (8) in this text imply that the in- 
vestment and saving ratios would adjust monotonically over time even if there 
were no  investment-savings gap.  Since there is no justification for such a 
trend, we have also estimated the equations of table 7.4 with the constraint 
that there is no constant term. The results are very similar to the coefficients 
of table 7.4 and are not presented to save space. 
We  have also repeated this dynamic analysis for the nine EEC countries 
alone. The basic results, presented in table 7.5, are very similar to the result 
for the entire OECD. Investment adjusts to the lagged investment-savings gap 
while saving does not adjust. The coefficients for the EEC also imply a small 
savings retention, confirming the results in section 7.3. The other principal 
difference between the two sets of results is that the unconstrained coefficients 
suggest that the effect of an increase in saving is smaller than the effect of an 
increase in investment. This may reflect only the bias referred to above that 
results if the disturbance is serially correlated. 
It would be  worthwhile to examine the adjustment process more exten- 
sively, considerably more general adjustment dynamics and using estimation 217  National Saving and International Investment 
Table 7.5  Dynamic Adjustment of Investment and Saving in Nine EEC 
Countries 
Coefficient of Lagged 
Dependent  Coefficient 

















196  1-86 
1961-86 
1961-86 





-  ,159 
(.ow 
-  .015 
(.037) 
-  ,225 
(.045) 
-  ,059 




-  .216 
(.055) 
















-  .I60 
Norer The nine EEC countries exclude Spain, Portugal, and Luxemborg. 
methods that are consistent in the presence of serial correlation, although that 
may provide little reassurance with such small samples. 
7.6.1  Persistent Current Account Imbalances 
The specification of equation (7) implies that each country will adjust its 
investment to eliminate eventually the entire investment-saving gap. A more 
general specification would recognize that countries may instead have a “nor- 
mal” nonzero level of current account surplus or deficit to which they adjust. 
We consider therefore the following generalization of equation (7): 
(9) 
where GAP is the desired or normal investment-saving gap. Equation (9) is 
only distinguishable from equation (7) when the GAP is permitted to vary 
among countries. 
Equation (9) has therefore been estimated with  individual constant terms 
for each of the 23 OECD countries using data for 1961-86. Separate estimates 
for the subperiods 1961-73  and  1974-86  have also been calculated. The re- 
sults are presented in table 7.6. 
Equation (1) of table 7.6 corresponds to equation (9) for the entire period 
1961-86. Equations (2) and (3) correspond to the two subperiods. 
The individual constant terms correspond to substantial positive “normal” 
or “target” investment-saving gaps in several countries including Australia, 218  Martin Feldstein and Philippe Bacchetta 
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New Zealand, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, and Ireland. There were 
fewer countries with negative target investment-saving balances, but these in- 
cluded Germany, France, Switzerland,  the Netherlands and, since 1974, Ja- 
pan. It is clear that these “normal” or “target” investment-saving balances do 
correspond  generally  to the  economic  situations  of  the  countries  with  the 
lower income, countries  more likely to seek capital inflows while  the  high 
saving and older industrial countries correspond to a target excess of  saving 
over investment. 
7.7  Conclusion 
The basic conclusion of the present analysis is that an increase in domestic 
saving has a substantial effect on the level of domestic investment although a 
smaller effect than would have been  observed in the  1960s and  1970s. The 219  National Saving and International Investment 
more closely integrated economies of the EEC also appear to have more out- 
ward  capital mobility (i.e, a lower savings retention coefficient) than other 
OECD countries. 
There is no support for the view that the estimated saving-investment rela- 
tion reflects a spurious impact of  an omitted economic growth variable. Al- 
though budget deficits are inversely related to the difference between private 
investment and private saving, we reject the view that this reflects an endoge- 
nous response of fiscal policy in favor of the alternative interpretation that the 
negative relation is evidence of  the crowding out of  private investment by 
budget deficits. This interpretation is supported by the evidence that domestic 
investment responds equally to private saving and budget deficits. 
The dynamic adjustment analysis supports the view that domestic invest- 
ment adjusts rather quickly when there is an unwanted investment-saving gap 
while domestic saving shows little tendency to adjust. 
The implication of the analysis thus supports the original Feldstein-Horioka 
conclusions that increases in domestic saving do raise a nation’s capital stock 
and thereby the productivity of  its work force. Similarly, a tax on capital in- 
come is not likely to be shifted to labor and land by  the outflow of  enough 
domestic capital to maintain the real rate of return unchanged. 
Notes 
1. These include Feldstein  (1983),  Caprio and Howard (1984), Murphy  (1984), 
Penati and Dooley (1984), Sachs (1983), and Summers (1988). See Dooley, Frankel, 
and Mathieson (1987) for a summary of these results. 
2.  For a more complete discussion of these issues, see the essay by Frankel in this 
volume. 
3.  The text of  Summer’s paper does not specify the sample of countries or years for 
which his regression  was estimated, but elsewhere in his paper he indicates that an 
equation using the deficit variable as an instrumental variable is limited to this sample 
of countries and years because of data limitations. 
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Comment  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Feldstein's discovery of the tight link between national saving and investment 
rates continues to baffle the profession. Ample research over the past  few 
years has failed to reject the basic finding: if  a country raises the national 
saving rate by a percentage point, most of the increase in saving is retained in 
the form of increased investment.' The Feldstein finding runs counter to the 
spirit of  the open economy literature in which, under conditions of perfect 
capital mobility, changes in national saving rates are primarily reflected in the 
current account, not in investment.* 
Figure 7C. 1 shows the basic evidence: using averages for the 1960-86  pe- 
riod, saving and investment rates for 23 OECD countries obey  a very high 
positive correlation. 
Rudiger Dornbusch is the Ford International Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts In- 
1. For a review see esp. Dooley et al. (1987). 
2. An earlier theory, popular in the United Kingdom, argued that budget deficits and external 
deficits were highly correlated because of  a tendency for private investment to match saving. See 
Godley and Cripps (1983). 
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Gross fixed investment  5.89  .75  .74 
Construction:  2.51  .49  .53 
Residential  I .99  .I5  .24 
Nonresidential  .53  .34  .38 
Machinery and equipment  3.31  .26  .23 
(2.67)  (8.05) 
(1.09)  (5.07) 
(1.54)  (2.85) 
(3)  (3.82) 
(1.53)  (2.78) 
Note:  Saving and investment are measured as a fraction of  GDP. Each observation is the 1960- 
86 period average for a country. 
The corresponding regression, using OLS on the cross-section period aver- 
ages is shown in table 7C. 1 below. This evidence suggests that economies are 
three-quarters closed of  an extra percentage point saving only one quarter 
will be reflected in an improvement of the external balance while three quar- 
ters find their way into increased investment. Table 7C. 1 also shows the break- 
down of investment by component. 
Table 7C. 1 shows that the systematic effect of investment on saving extends 
to the components of investment; for each category of investment the coeffi- 
cient is statistically significant. Half of  an extra percentage point saving goes 
into construction and a quarter into machinery and equipment. 222  Martin Feldstein and Philippe Bacchetta 
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Faced with  the evidence, the question  is what implications to draw. For 
Feldstein one interesting question is an application to taxation: “Do tax poli- 
cies that stimulate a nation’s private saving rate increase its domestic capital 
stock or do the extra savings flow abroad? Does an increase in the corporate 
tax rate cause an outflow of capital that shifts the burden of the tax increase to 
labor, and land?” The three-quarters result shown above is used by Feldstein 
to suggest that policies that promote  saving will raise domestic investment, 
not foreign lending. To judge whether the inference is warranted at the margin 
we have to ask what gives rise to the high saving-investment correlation. 
What Are the Channels? 
Much of the literature spawned by the Feldstein result takes issue with the 
initial finding. By now that discussion has run out of steam; the fact is sturdy 
and the debate is turning to the interpretation. The Feldstein finding raises the 
question of why there should be such a strong link in open economies between 
saving and investment. Four possible explanations suggest themselves: 
Constraints on external balances,  especially for deficit countries, limit the 
extent  to  which  investment  can get  out  of  line with  saving.  These con- 
straints may take the form of limitations on external financing or of a gov- 
ernment reaction function, as proposed by Summers (1988). In this analysis 
governments raise public-sector saving in response to incipient external def- 
icits and thus contain the size of net foreign lending. 
There is imperfect capital mobility within economies so that many, if  not 
most,  firms  have to rely on internal financing  of investment.  As a result 
investment cannot deviate substantially from saving. While there is capital 
mobility in respect to public-sector debt and finance of large corporations, 
the brunt of  firms are constrained in that they do not have access to world 
markets.  Murphy’s  (1984) evidence on the high saving retention by major 
corporations suggests that this effect may be operative. 
Internationally there is imperfect capital mobility because of investors’ risk 
aversion. Regulatory treatment of financial institutions reinforces the cross- 
border reluctance of capital flows. 
The correlation reflects an economic structure that induces simultaneously 
both high  saving and high  investment.  This contrasts  with  the  Feldstein 
interpretation that structural factors (demographics,  social security arrange- 
ments, taxation, etc.) determine saving and lead to a crowding in, by chan- 
nels that remain unidentified, of investment. 
Among the competing explanations Feldstein emphasizes imperfect capital 
mobility:  the  cross-border obstacles  are  sufficiently  large,  especially  for 
longer maturities, that investment is crowded in domestically whenever saving 
rises. The mechanism for crowding in is not clear, however. If  domestic capi- 
tal markets are open and competitive we should expect systematic  relation- 
ships between the cost of capital across countries.  Other things equal, high 223  National Saving and International Investment 
saving countries should have a low cost of capital and low saving countries a 
high cost of capital. The cross-border reluctance of capital would allow these 
cost of  capital differentials to persist. I am not aware of  a direct test of  the 
imperfect capital mobility hypothesis in this form. 
It might be argued, of course, that crowding in takes place not only via the 
cost of capital but also and perhaps primarily via relaxation of credit ration- 
ing. In this view the explicit cost of  capital, for moral hazard reasons, does 
little of the work and less obviously observable variations in credit constraints 
provide the mechanism. The ready availability of credit thus induces invest- 
ment to fall in line with saving. 
If  imperfect international capital mobility  is in fact the basis for the ob- 
served correlations we would  expect increasingly organizations to develop 
means of overcoming the risks that stand in the way of capital flows. It may 
be risky to borrow for 30 years in dollars in the United States in order to make 
yen loans in Japan. But multinational corporations who operate in multiple 
markets are natural agents for diversifying away the risks and thus exploit 
cost-of-capital differences. Direct foreign investment, which is becoming very 
sizable, may then be a reflection of the cost of capital differentials arising from 
cross-border reluctance of portfolio capital flows. 
Feldstein is certainly right in emphasizing the international immobility, un- 
til very recently, of most saving done via financial institutions such as pension 
funds or life insurance companies. Once again, their increasing perception of 
a world  capital market  should work  in the direction of  reducing the  local 
crowding in tendency observed in the past. 
Beyond the perfect capital mobility argument it is certainly the case that 
there is some correlation between saving and investment as a result of com- 
mon determinants, For example, if the age structure of the population is such 
as to favor a high saving rate the same age structure induces an expansion of 
investment in nontraded goods industries and construction to supply the large 
“internal market.” Conversely, if the transition to an aging population reduces 
the national saving rate it is likely that investment in such an economy will 
also decline, not only because of a reduced availability of domestic financing 
but also because the opportunities for profitable domestic investment decline 
with a shrinking of the market. Indeed, the falloff in domestic investment may 
even precede the decline in the savings rate. 
Table 7C.2 shows the projections of  aging trends in industrialized coun- 
tries. The steep increase in Japanese age would suggest, on the above argu- 
ment, an increasing tendency for Japanese foreign lending in the coming dec- 
ades. 
The view that investment is determined by the available supply of saving is 
suggestive for high saving countries. In high saving countries an inordinately 
large share of  saving (by comparison with  a world  of  unrestricted capital 
flows, full information and little risk aversion) is retained nationally. But how 
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Figure 7C.2  U.S. saving and investment ratios (percentage of GNP) 
investment is high relative to saving? Specifically, why is investment not more 
fully crowded out by the lack of  domestic saving? In part the answer to this 
question may have to do with the question whose deficit is being financed. 
Whose Deficit? 
Figure 7C.2 shows the U.S.  saving and investment rates in the 1960-86 
period. We  note the striking discrepancy between the 1980s (marked as black 
dots) and the earlier period. It is clear that the general positive correlation 
observed in the period averages in 1960-86 broke down in the U.S. in recent 
years. Current account deficits have become large as the decline in the na- 
tional saving rate was not matched by a corresponding decline in the invest- 
ment rate. 
It is interesting to speculate whether this new development reflects a world- 225  National Saving and International Investment 
wide breaking down of  reluctance to cross-border lending or whether it is 
peculiar to the U.S. case. The latter could be argued if foreign investors care 
which country they finance. It may make a difference whether the decline in 
saving occurs in a large country with a developed financial market or in a 
small country with little scope for uncomplicated cross-border investment. 
Moreover, it may make an important difference whether the decline in saving 
arises in the private sector or in the public sector. With a developed market in 
government debt there may be scope for easy cross-border financing while a 
decline in private saving may require more complicated intermediation. 
To  support the argument that government deficits are more “financeable” 
and hence have more significant foreign lending effects we can look at less- 
developed countries LDCs. Would Brazil, Mexico or Korea have been able to 
run very large persistent external deficits if  the private sector had been the 
borrower rather than the government through state enterprises? No doubt, the 
private sector can borrow some, but it is doubtful that lending would have 
reached the proportions it did in the 1970s in that case. 
Two Disagreements 
In  concluding I wish  to comment on  two conclusions in  the Feldstein- 
Bacchetta paper that I do not share. The first concerns the evidence on a spe- 
cial EEC effect. Table 7C.3 shows the results of the investment equation with 
an EEC dummy added. It is clear that there is no special effect for EEC mem- 
bership. That is not really surprising since capital mobility between Switzer- 
land and Germany, for example, is certainly higher than that between Ger- 
many and France.  In  fact, there were tighter capital controls among EEC 
members than outside the EEC group. 
My other disagreement concerns the calculation of “normal gaps” reported 
in the paper. These plainly do not make much sense. The gap is determined 
by structural factors on the saving side and by investment opportunities. There 
is no presumption that these factors remain invariant over extended periods of 
time. Table 7C.4 shows examples for several countries. For the case of Japan 
and Korea there is a trend toward “structural surpluses,” for the United States 
there is presumably a short-lived deterioration and only for Germany is there 
any tendency for stable, long-run surpluses. 
Table 7C.3  EEC Effects in the Saving Retention 
Constant  S  EEC*S  RZ 
Gross investment  6.79  .73  -0.05  .76 
Net investment  4.57  .79  -  .07  .70 
(3.05)  (7.92)  (- 1.50) 
(2.99)  (7.20)  (- 1.28) 
Note: EEC denotes a dummy for EEC membership, excluding,  however, Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain. 226  Martin Feldstein and Philippe Bacchetta 
Table 7C.4  Net Exports (percentage of GDP, national income account basis) 
1960-69  1970-79  1980-86 
Japan  .2  .8  2.3 
Germany  2.1  2.6  2.5 
United States  .2  -  .5  -  1.8 
Korea  -  10.1  -  5.9  -  1.6 
Source: IMF. 
Concluding Remarks 
The  Feldstein  thesis  of  unusually  high  savings  retention  is  now  well- 
established as a fact; perhaps just as it is established it is also going away as a 
result of sharply increased international financial intermediation.  The reason 
for  the  finding  remains undiscovered  and  presumably  there  need  not  be  a 
single one. Unless we understand why savings retention is so high, or in what 
particular  situations,  we certainly  should not  use the observed relations  to 
make strong inferences about the investment response to saving policies. The 
U.S. example in the 1980s offers a strong reminder that much of  the change 
in  saving can easily  find  its  way  into changed  foreign  lending  rather  than 
changes in investment. 
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